### Plan

#### Plan: The United States federal government should remove its sanctions on Cuba.

### The Advantage is Multilateralism

#### Absent a shift to multilateralism, US leadership will collapse and cause global nuclear war

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Unilateralism is the wrong approach for American Diplomacy. There is nothing to suggest its efficacy since 9/11. There is nothing to suggest its usefulness for future conflict. In allowing the US to go it alone, America's partners and allies risk the havoc and catastrophic consequences that will accompany "Imperial Overstretch." The residue of overstretch will include loss of US leadership in the world, an economy whose decline affects billions of dollars in international markets, and certainly emboldens rogue states. The whole world will pay the price if we let unilateralism pervade this century. As the bloodiest 100 years in recorded history, the 20th Century is replete with examples of how policy and practice intersect to foment war. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the constantly mutating dynamic of terrorism inform our current, dangerous reality. Amidst this backdrop of destruction, there are lessons for those who are looking for them. Seeds of peacemaking and conflict resolution were planted which we must germinate in order to halt and then reverse the trend toward violence and chaos. Perhaps the 21st Century could be the first 100 years in which nations invest more in building peace than in making war. In the 20th Century, local conflicts ignited global tensions and genocide on an unprecedented scale, costing incalculable life and treasure. The two world wars and other explosive conflicts erupted over such issues as ethnic disputes, the securing of natural resources, corporate interests, ideology and religion. The international business of war produced economies of scale prompted by the industrial, technological, and communications revolutions. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife in Sarajevo by anarchist Gavrilo Princip was the spark that ignited WWI. In time, some 15 million people would be killed. The sheer brutality of that war led Woodrow Wilson to issue his "Fourteen Points" in 1918, which included the establishment of a League of Nations "for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Just like our present-day difficulties in pursuing compromise, the US Congress politicized the concept, bucked the President, and did not support that initiative. The subsequent failure of the League of Nations to prevent WWII may have galvanized our culture's distrust of multilateralism. Throughout the 20th Century and until today, nations and other entities have invested precious financial, intellectual, social, institutional and political capital into arming themselves with weaponry, instead of building their capacity for peace. Technologies change and improve with increasing rapidity, but those advances have included improvements in how to kill more people more efficiently and with smaller devices. WWII was the shining example of multilateralism and its power. Vietnam and Korea were examples of its limitations. South Africa and India demonstrated that the support of the international community could enable countries to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. All these contribute and form the basis of the state of nations today. The 20th Century left us at a crossroads: will we perpetuate the machinery and culture of war or surpass our greatest dreams by encouraging and enforcing peace policies and practices worldwide? The 21st Century began ominously with the attacks of September 11, 2001, which ushered in a new era of US foreign policy and global response to war, conflict and terrorism. Rather than engage a sympathetic world in developing multilateral and inclusive strategies similar to the precursors to the 2003 Iraq War and as was done before the Persian Gulf War, the US squandered its global capital to pursue "pre-emptive" unilateral military action. The equal and increasingly matching reaction is a global culture of military aggression and war. The resulting disintegration of the international community contributed to the most serious economic disaster since the Great Depression. Already struggling to survive amidst broken economies, the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and global terrorism strains multilateralism when it should embolden it. If it is true that every weapon invented is eventually used, we have much to fear if we do not reverse this lethal trend. Since national conflicts frequently spill over into regional and world-wide conflict, multilateral organizations have been very strong supporters of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. Even the US found a way to first investigate and then come to terms with its terrible policy of putting Japanese-Americans in internment camps during WWII and apologized and paid reparations to survivors and their children. There were important Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa, supported by the international community. Victims and perpetrators of Apartheid who participated in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions demonstrated in compelling ways the healing and restorative power of those gatherings. Perhaps more importantly, they showed the world that a nonviolent response to unthinkable oppression and injustice can foster the peaceful development of a society intent upon making amends for the past and embarking upon a brighter, shared future. Since conflict-resolution and peacemaking at the local or national level work, why not apply it multilaterally? Concerned about the resurgence of unilateralism in the US's current Marjeh and Kandahar operations in Afghanistan, former Assistant Secretary of State Gene Dewey recently noted that "it's been very lonely being a leading multilateralist in Washington over the last nine years. Too few policy-makers have sensed where our unilateralism has led, and is leading." Saudi Arabia and other authoritarian Islamic countries generated the seeds that not only birthed the terrorists who carried out 9/11, but also attacks in Madrid, London, Mumbai and Chechnya. No matter where terrorists are determined to attempt to disrupt the lives of others, it's time for countries to realize that the only way to confront contemporary terrorism is through multilateralism. This must be a multilateralism that is thoroughly infused with peacemaking and conflict-resolution, instead of only "joint forces." At this crossroads, we can use the knowledge economy, social network and the international community to turn the rhetoric of hope into reality. We sit upon an historical precipice of policies and practices of sustainable, culturally responsive peace-building and violence prevention within and beyond our borders. Despite their faults, the institutions set up after in response to WWII (UN) and the Cold War (NATO) can be the 21st Century's vehicles for peace. We can use those instruments of multilateralism to build the peacekeeping, disaster relief, and conflict resolution forces that bring countries together. "Actually, I believe we have strategically shifted from that of a global war on terror (GWOT) to containing violent extremism (CVE). That said, the reason extremists do what they do is because they recruit from amongst the most desperate people on the earth. And, the reasons for desperation are strategic---but not necessarily military in nature. In fact, we have the capability to wage peace that is just as sophisticated as our capability to make war. Water, AIDS, mass migration of people, desertification, poverty, hunger, and disease---What would happen if our National Security Strategy became a multilateral one of economic engagement, and used the brain power and resources available to mitigate these issues?" -- Lt. Col. Matthew Canfield, U.S. Army (Currently on his second tour in Iraq) Concerns over economic stability, limited resources and security have divided us. Now is the time to create rather than divide common ground.

#### U.S. lead Latin American multilateralism is vital to solve hemispheric problems – their influence disads are wrong and selective engagement fails

Boniface, Prof. of Poli Sci @ Rollins, 2010

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While the U.S. position in the world is in relative decline, the country continues to be dominant in a number of aspects. Its economy is the world’s largest and probably the most dynamic. U.S. industries are at the forefront of technological advances and its universities lead the world in terms of investment for research and development. The U.S. is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world and is a safe haven for investors in times of crisis. The weight of the United States is amplified at the regional level where, in spite of important regional variations, Latin America’s economies remain (for better or worse) largely dependent on the United States. On the one hand, the United States is the largest investor in Latin America and the largest source of FDI in the region, followed by Spain, Canada, Holland and Japan. On the other hand, it is also the region’s main trading partner: trade between Latin America and the United States is significantly higher than that with China and the European Union combined. Even in South America where several countries have sought new economic partnerships with Asia and Europe and pursued more independent foreign policies, the United States remains the largest trading partner. In 2008, the United States was the largest source of foreign imports and the leading export destination for every major country in the region except Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. For their part, Central America, the Dominican Republic and Mexico, linked to the U.S. economy by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the United States- Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), remain as dependent on the U.S. as ever. Furthermore, the links between the U.S. and Latin America are not only economic but also social and cultural; this is evidenced by consumption patterns, migration and tourism. The bottom line is that the fate of Latin America is still closely tied to that of the United States. The increased presence in the region of extra- hemispheric actors, such as China, India, Iran and Russia (not to mention Japan or Spain), has generated many headlines heralding the end of the Monroe Doctrine. Yet the presence of such extra-hemispheric actors is actually less relevant than it seems. Chinese trade and investment in the region, for example, have grown dramatically but remain heavily concentrated in the commodity sectors of certain South American countries, especially Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. Furthermore, in other sectors such as textiles, electronics and light manufacturing, China is a fierce competitor, especially for Mexico and Central America. Thus, although the increased presence of Asian and European countries has caused a slight decline in the U.S. position in the region and contributed to a perception that Latin American countries have new options for integration, the U.S. economy remains a key factor in Latin America’s development. The final reason why the new multilateralism in Latin America will not substantially reduce the U.S. role in regional governance is that Latin America faces serious collective action problems to achieve co-operation without the participation of the United States. Past attempts at regional integration have resulted in many forgotten acronyms and even in the most successful cases these attempts have not succeeded in promoting deep integration. Despite the recent efforts of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, Brazilian President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and others, Latin American countries are far from reaching agreements to co-ordinate security, energy and development policies, adopt a common currency, or even establish something as simple as a common visa policy. The reality is that Latin American states are divided into distinct subgroups with conflicting political and economic interests. Furthermore, in some cases, such as between Bolivia and Chile, and between Colombia and Venezuela, there is open hostility. In short, the new multilateralism in Latin America has not achieved tangible results which would suggest that U.S. influence in regional governance is decreasing dramatically. At the same time, there are still many steps that can and should be taken to revive and promote co-operation between the U.S. and Latin America. The Obama administration: A new partnership? How should the United States and the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama in particular respond to the new challenges of Latin American multilateralism? In a sense, this question is part of a broader issue related to U.S. foreign policy for it is not only the inter- American system but also the entire architecture of Western-dominated global institutions that need reconfiguration in the new millennium. It makes perfect sense to start the process of reform in the Americas. The United States effectively has two options: maintain the status quo or promote the “new partnership” that Obama defended in his campaign for the presidency. The first option, inherited from former president George W. Bush and softened by Obama, is not ideal, though it has some benefits. The crux of this strategy, described as “multilateralism à la carte,” is to selectively engage interested parties on narrowly defined issues. This strategy allows the United States to develop closer ties with key partners such as Canada, Colombia and Mexico and, at the same time, avoid the conflict entailed by deepening its relations with a broader set of actors and a wider range of topics. The strategy effectively sidelines the hemisphere’s fiercest critics of American policy such as Chávez, former Cuban leader Fidel Castro, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in favor of a wait-and-see approach, which is premised on the assumption that these radical regimes will eventually collapse under the weight of their own contradictions before their deepening ties with Iran or Russia pose any substantial security risk to the United States or our allies. The approach is pragmatic, because it minimizes the problems of collective action, and also efficient in the sense that U.S. influence increases in a bilateral or selectively multilateral setting. It is, however, a strategy lacking long-term vision. For one, several of the most important problems in the region —drug trafficking, environmental conservation and migration among others— are essentially transnational issues for which bilateral and partial solutions are insufficient. Second, on issues such as arms control and energy security where the United States has strategic interests at stake, a wait-and-see approach is obviously inadequate. Finally, much like the debate on the reform of the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these discussions are critical to the legitimacy of the United States. An alternative strategy demands a new commitment to revitalize the hemispheric agenda. Although Obama’s policy proposal for a “New Partnership for the Americas” outlines a number of sensible changes in U.S. policy toward Latin America, the document ultimately fails to respond to the challenges of the new Latin American multilateralism in the region. To adapt to a new global and regional environment, the United States needs to develop a new foreign policy approach that is at once firm and flexible and, above all, must explore multiple mechanisms for co-operation on issues of common interest. Thus, the United States should seek to strengthen traditional inter-American institutions such as the OAS and the IDB but also facilitate the creation of new and potentially more dynamic mechanisms of co-operation. This paper puts forward three ideas on how the U.S. could fulfill the promise of a new partnership with Latin America. First, the Obama administration must continue to distance itself from the unilateral policies of the previous Bush administration. It is important that President Obama makes it clear that multilateral co-operation is the core of U.S. foreign policy and that the unilateralism of the Bush era was a temporary aberration. As was seen during the 2009 Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the Obama administration’s renewed emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy has paid dividends in terms of the improved U.S. image in the region. Yet the recent (and avoidable) conflicts with regional leaders over the use of military bases in Colombia and the use of military force to deliver humanitarian assistance to Haiti after the country’s devastating earthquake, demonstrate that the countries in the area remain sensitive to the use of U.S. military force in the region. President Obama must therefore show more sensitivity on this issue than he has so far. Second, although it is essential that the United States listens to the leaders of Latin America and encourages the development of regional initiatives, the U.S. presence in the region must remain robust. The recent democratic crisis in Honduras confirms this. Although a consensus was quickly reached on the illegality of the overthrow of former president Manuel Zelaya and on the suspension of Honduras from the OAS, the failure of the United States to articulate a strong and consistent policy led to a power vacuum since no other country in the region had the same level of influence in this country. When the United States subsequently took more decisive actions to break the deadlock in Honduras, it had the unintended consequence of rupturing the regional consensus. This situation caused the United States to be diplomatically upstaged by Brazil on the issue of democracy promotion —even as Lula remained silent about the abuses of power by Chávez and Ortega, and rolled out the welcome mat for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

#### 3 Internal Links – Embargo removal is key

#### First, nations see it as a filter for U.S. policy in the region

Olopade, Media Scholar @ Yale, 2009

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Ever since President John Kennedy placed the trade and travel embargo on Castro’s regime, U.S.-Cuban relations have been a proxy for other political concerns—the Cold War struggle against Communism, American global authority and tangled domestic politics within the swing state of Florida, where many Cuban Americans are concentrated. Today, leaders from large nations like Argentina, Mexico and Brazil view the cause of Cuban openness as a proxy for their own relationship with the United States. The dozens of nations in the continent that do recognize Cuba reportedly resent a “Cubanization” of regional policy—and “have made Cuba the litmus test for judging Washington’s policy toward Latin America,” said Julia Sweig, director of Latin Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, at a conference this week. The White House acknowledged as much the same day of its Cuba announcement: The U.S. has “neglected its relationships in this part of the world,” said Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow, director of American presence at the summit. “Whether one agrees with that perception or not, it certainly is a very strongly felt perception.” The U.S. delegation would like to focus the summit on three main subject areas: economic stability, energy action and public safety—the former because some 50 million people could drift back under the poverty line after the gains of the last five to six years, and the latter as violence related to drug trafficking has exploded along the U.S.-Mexican border in 2009. (The Department of Homeland Security recently appointed Alan Bersin as a “border czar” to help confront that problem.) The White House has said it will consider appointing a regional diplomat to handle Latin American issues, similar to the kind sent to handle climate change, the Middle East and Israel/Palestine. But, both because of the new shift in policy and the expectations of summit partners, Cuba may still have an oversized presence in deliberations—a presence it no longer really deserves. Despite today’s heated rhetoric surrounding Cuban human rights abuses, crackdowns on speech, retrograde labor practices or presidential posturing, the island nation has barely been of strategic significance to the United States since the founding fathers thought they would, after annexing Florida, turn Cuba into the next American state. With only 11 million people, it’s a fraction of the size of Brazil, which is hankering to join the UN Security Council, and the same size as Bolivia, which sits on important lithium deposits to be used in next-generation battery technology. It has no weapons, and no real enemies—besides the United States. Still, “unilateral sanctions are bad policy in almost every situation,” says William Reinsch, president of the National Foreign Trade Council. And Cuba has been a particularly ridiculous case in point. In addition to being hypocritical (the U.S. promotes free trade and is supposedly anti-terror; yet we don’t trade with Cuba, and former Cuban radicals live in the United States), the embargo is widely recognized to have been a failure. Both Castro and his brother, Raul, after all, are still running the country. And this stubbornness has enervated American allies in the Caribbean—as Obama may soon find out. So there is a large incentive to junk the failed policy toward Cuba—not because doing so would change anything about the 21st century world order, but because it presents an easy opportunity for Obama to signal that he’s a real change agent. Cubans have seen almost a dozen American presidents come and go with no shift in treatment—though polling suggests U.S. public opinion toward the communist state has softened in recent years. Havana is warming to more open relations, too. Todd Omestead, a reporter who recently returned from the city, said “there’s tremendous enthusiasm” in Cuba about the first black president of the U.S. (“Let’s do a trade: You take Raul Castro, we’ll take Barack Obama,” someone told him.) Indeed, even Fidel Castro is reportedly rooting for Obama to succeed. Following a trip to Cuba with the Congressional Black Caucus, Rep. Laura Richardson of California said that the elder Castro “watched the election, he listened to the speeches, and he wants Barack Obama to succeed…. He sincerely wants in his lifetime to see change in the United States.”

Second, it delegitimizes the OAS

Suver 4/24/12 (Roman, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Looking back on the Cuba distraction at Cartagena and the Failure of the US Latin America Policy”, www.coha.org/looking-back-on-the-cuba-distraction-at-cartagena-and-the-failure-of-the-u-s-latin-america-policy/

This pronouncement and the U.S.’ opposition to Cuba’s future involvement in OAS-related hemispheric gatherings effectively acted as a unilateral veto, as Canada was the only other summit attendee to oppose Cuba’s reintegration, though Prime Minister Stephen Harper reportedly considered supporting the majority position on Cuba’s unconditional readmittance. This stubborn and clearly ideologically-based U.S. move served to do nothing but further alienate the U.S. from the region at a time when it is actively attempting to build both economic and political alliances. Furthermore, by exacerbating the divide between traditional U.S. pan-American policy and the Latin American position through his comments, Obama ensured that the topic of Cuba would continue to dominate the discussion throughout the summit, instead of allowing for a unified hemispheric discourse on other important and pressing regional matters to command media attention. Not surprisingly, amidst the polarizing environment in Cartagena, the Sixth Summit of the Americas concluded without a joint declaration on the agenda’s subjects, further accentuating the dysfunctional nature of current hemispheric politics.¶ Ahead of the Summit, Ecuador’s President, Rafael Correa, wrote a letter to the summit’s host, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, in which he declared his intention to boycott the meeting in protest of Cuba’s ongoing exile. He further pledged that Ecuador would boycott any future gatherings that excluded Cuba as long as he remains in office, and urged fellow ALBA members to do the same. While it appeared last week that no other nation would take similar steps, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega abstained from attending at the last minute, boycotting the event on the same grounds as Correa, despite his government’s presence in Cartagena. There had been speculation prior to the meeting that some Latin American countries, especially those with memberships in ALBA, would decline to join Ecuador in boycotting the event in hopes that the U.S. would soften its position on Cuba during the weekend’s meeting, making a gesture that could worsen trade relations with the U.S. unnecessary. However, after Obama’s steadfast reiteration of the U.S.’ stance, all eight ALBA members moved swiftly to decry the Cuban situation, vowing to boycott all subsequent Summits of the Americas if Cuba is not granted unconditional participation. Perhaps not so surprisingly, this same sentiment was echoed by some of South America’s most influential nations, including Mercosur members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.¶ The increasingly vocal and adamant calls for Cuba’s inclusion by Latin America, and the growing number of provocative comments being made by Latin American leaders about ending North American hegemony in the region, are ominous signs for the abiding strength of the U.S.’ influence in the region. With the prospect of the majority of the next Summit’s attendees boycotting the event under the current status quo, the future of the OAS and North American participation in Latin American affairs appears noticeably bleak. There are already a number of regional organizations which exclude the U.S. and Canada, CELAC and UNASUR among them, and their increasing relevance to international cooperation in the Americas does not bode well for North America. If the U.S. continues to persistently adhere to its current stance on Cuba through to the 2015 Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama, there is a distinct possibility that the OAS could lose all legitimacy as well as its influence as exasperated Latin American countries refuse to participate. This could lead to both a rethinking of U.S. policy towards Cuba, and greater cooperation and concessions by the U.S., pursuant to a more unified and egalitarian Western Hemisphere dynamic. Conversely, if the U.S. continues its archaic and neo-imperialistic stance, bodies like CELAC would stand to gain considerable influence, and could perhaps even replace the OAS as the hemisphere’s primary pan-American body and standard-bearer for regional cooperation.¶ In either scenario, the inescapable reality becomes quite clear; no matter how U.S. policy towards Latin America evolves in the near future, the U.S.’ longstanding and powerful influence in Central and South America is beginning to wane. Newly developing export markets and swift economic growth in Latin America are bolstering the region’s ability to function independently of more developed powers like the U.S., and the more the region continues to develop, the stronger its thirst for self-determinism will become. As Central and South America continue to modernize in their quest to join the ranks of developed world powers, the U.S. will continue to watch its previously formidable regional will diminish. The more Washington is willing to proactively amend its foreign policy towards Latin America to promote a more respectful and reciprocal partnership arrangement, the better its prospects will become in forging long-term amicable alliances and beneficial economic partnerships with a rapidly upsurging region.

#### Third, removal is a necessary first step to effective conflict resolution models

Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf>) //CW

At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo5 - a powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba. The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towardsCuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations. While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba. On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If negotiations break down and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, international support would be easier to garner. Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy. Policy and National Interest Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years. From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7 The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15 By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments. The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba. A History of Anger and Distrust After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations. Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba. The embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20 Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26 Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries. It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro. Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic engagement in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba. To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations. As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations. Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement. The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed. How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba. Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security. In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool. Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.? Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems. While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations. Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow. The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate. Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these. We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government. If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections. The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions. While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected. Conclusion Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.

#### Multiple scenarios –

#### Scenario 1 is resource cmpetition

#### Competition over resources is inevitable – it’s a question of if effective multilateral frameworks are in place to resolve disputes

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[November 2010, Alex, Senior Fellow at the NYU Center on International Cooperation, MA in Politics from the University of Edinburgh, “Globalization and Scarcity: Multilateralism for a world with limits,” New York University Center on International Cooperation, http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/evans\_multilateral\_scarcity.pdf] Idriss

The US National Intelligence Council’s 2008 report on global trends to 2025 observed that “even actions short of war will have important geopolitical implications as states undertake strategies to hedge against the possibility that existing energy supplies will not meet rising demand”, noting trends including Chinese and Indian purchases of equity stakes in energy fields, energy-deficient states employing “transfers of arms and sensitive technologies and the promise of a political and military alliance as inducements to establish strategic relationships with energy-producing states”, and increased naval competition “in a zone extending from the Persian Gulf to East and Southeast Asia”. As Michael Klare summarizes: “...the leaders of most countries involved in the great energy race have come to view the struggle over hydrocarbon assets as a “zero sum” contest ... a zero-sum mentality leads to a loss of flexibility in crisis situations, while the lens of nationalism turns the pursuit of energy assets into a sacred obligation of senior government officials.” 185 More recently, a similar dynamic has been seen in the context of inter-state competition for land and food , as import-dependent countries seek to agree overseas security of supply deals for food or land. While there is often a lack of transparency about such deals, among the examples reported in the media are Chinese attempts to secure 1.24 million hectares of land in the Philippines (in a deal subsequently blocked), 700,000 hectares in Laos, 2 million hectares for biofuel production in Zambia and 2.8 million hectares for the same purpose in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 186 Other key food importers, including the United Arab Emirates and South Korea, have also sought to improve their good security with similar deals. More acute forms of competition for food include the export restrictions discussed in the previous section. At the same time, countries that are not dependent on imported grain can also contribute to this emerging competition for land and food through their own land use policies: as already noted, the IMF, World Bank and Goldman Sachs all argued in 2008 that the single most significant driver of the food price spike was the diversion of US agricultural land to biofuel production. 187 On water, the key risk comes from trans-boundary fresh water resources. Today, there are 263 rivers that either span or delineate international borders. 188 It is important to note that so far, trans-boundary water resources have tended to trigger cooperation rather than conflicts between the countries that share them: research by Oregon State University, for example, finds that “cooperative interactions between riparian states over the past fifty years have outnumbered conflictive interactions by more than two-to-one.” 189 However, the same research also finds that 158 of the world’s 263 international river basins “lack any type of cooperative management framework.” 190 Moreover, with the prospect of climate change to consider, there is no guarantee that the future will look like the past. A particular concern here is the fact that many water-sharing agreements are based on a set volume of water rather than a percentage of what is available. 191 The risk of glacial retreat, most notably in the Himalayas, has also triggered concern about future water-driven conflict risks – as well as controversy, given the recent furor over erroneous IPCC projections that 80% of Himalayan glaciers would have disappeared by 2035. Existing glaciers provide dry season water resources to 1.3 billion people living in river basins including the Mekong, Irrawaddy, Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Yangtze and Yellow River. 192 As temperatures rise, some estimates (still valid, despite the recent IPCC controversy) suggest the risk of future dry season flow reductions of as much as 60-70% on the Ganges. 193 These kinds of forecast have led to increased concern about the potential risk of capture of water resources by particular countries (for instance in India, where there are fears about the potential for China to dam and divert the Brahmaputra river). 194 Another dimension of inter-state strategic resource competition centers on the impacts of climate change, and particularly the effects of rising sea levels . Current international law on maritime borders awards countries territorial rights extending 200 miles offshore from their coastlines, for example – but is silent on what happens if those coastlines recede because of climate change. 195 This grey legal area introduces the potential for future conflicts over issues including: • Border disputes, including in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Mexico; • Ownership of undersea energy resources (notably in the Arctic); • Newly navigable waterways (such as the North-West Passage and Northern Sea Route); • The sovereignty rights, resource claims, and populations of low-lying island states that disappear under rising sea levels; • The fate of ‘climate refugees’, which some estimates suggest could number 200 million by 2050 (although the number is disputed, and UNHCR also questions the very idea of ‘environmental refugees’). 196 Why is multilateral cooperation needed? Of all of the areas of action considered in this paper, it is in the context of strategic resource competition that the case for multilateralism is clearest. While the extent of globalization today may be unprecedented, conflict over resources is one of the oldest stories in the book – and it is, after all, preventing violent conflict between states that forms the principal raison d’être of the UN system.

#### Absent those protectionism and escalatory resource wars are inevitable

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[November 2010, Alex, Senior Fellow at the NYU Center on International Cooperation, MA in Politics from the University of Edinburgh, “Globalization and Scarcity: Multilateralism for a world with limits,” New York University Center on International Cooperation, http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/evans\_multilateral\_scarcity.pdf] Idriss

Climate change and resource scarcity have the potential to pose an existential challenge to globalization. While interdependence, complexity and prosperity have all increased massively over the past few decades as globalization has accelerated, the process has been neither sustainable, nor resilient, nor equitable. Now, scarcity issues – together with other global risks such as financial crises, pandemics like swine flu, or trans-boundary security risks such as terrorism and arms proliferation – are part of a range of threats to globalization that epitomize why this greater sustainability, equity and resilience is needed. Inevitably, the fact that increasing globalization has come with ‘shadow sides’ will lead some voices to argue that the process of globalization should be slowed, halted or even reversed. The risk of protectionism as a misguided response to the credit crunch and the ensuing global downturn remains very real. A global flu pandemic could lead to borders becoming less porous to international travel and migration. Scarcity issues could provide an even larger impetus for pulling away from global interdependence – whether towards greater, or towards intensifying competition (or conflict) for dwindling resources. This paper, however, has suggested that there is an alternative – that rests on more globalization and interdependence, not less. Crucially, though, it has argued that effective multilateral institutions and responsible sovereignty are the key to effecting this shift, and to nudging international relations towards increased levels of non-zero sum cooperation on scarcity issues instead of an intensifying zero sum competition for resources. It is not yet clear whether the process of creating a multilateralism capable of coping with scarcity will be a big bang (perhaps following a systemic crisis) or a slow, evolutionary process. What is already clear, though, is that it is a process that policymakers and publics have no real choice but to embark on together – and soon.

#### Protectionism causes nuclear war

Panzner 8 – faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” p. 136-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### Resource wars cause extinction – best case studies prove

Rosen 10 – Professor of Law and Policy @ GWU

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The seminal anthropological study by Jared Diamond provides historical support for the proposition that natural resource scarcity can lead to conflict that threatens U.S. security.[17] Diamond identified five contributing factors: environmental damage, climate change, hostile neighbors, friendly trade partners, and a society’s response to environmental problems that led to conflict among adjoining states and, ultimately, the risk of implosion leading to extinction.[18] Diamond asserts that [W]e shouldn’t be so naÃ¯ve to think that study of the past will yield simple solutions, directly transferable to our societies today. We differ from past societies in some respects that put us at lower risk than them; some of those respects often mentioned include our powerful technology (i.e., its beneficial effects), globalization, modern medicine, [etc.] . . . . We also differ from past societies in some respects that put us at greater risk than them: mentioned in that connection are, again, our potent technology (i.e., its unintended destructive effects), globalization (such that now a collapse even in remote Somalia affects the U.S. and Europe), the dependence of millions (and, soon, billions) of us on modern medicine for our survival, and our much larger human population. Perhaps we can still learn from the past, but only if we think carefully about its lessons.[19] Diamond’s anthropological study of the extinction of civilization on Easter Island in the South Pacific is a useful case study of the linkages between cultural decline and unsustainable use of carbon-based energy sources. Easter Island was blessed with a temperate climate and fertile soil as a result of volcanic activity.[20] However, the island’s temperateâ€”as opposed to tropicalâ€”climate and its geographic isolation meant that Easter Island was not endowed with as many fish species or freshwater supplies as some of its tropical counterparts.[21] Carbon dating of remains discloses that Easter Island was settled sometime around 900 A.D. and thrived until roughly 1700 A.D.[22] At one point, Easter Island had extensive agricultural activity, sophisticated systems for raising chicken and other livestock, incredible skill in stone masonry/engineering, and technology to construct large outriggers that could travel thousands of miles through the open ocean to engage in trade.[23] By the 1700s, however, the island’s populations of plants, wildlife, and people were in steep decline.[24] Diamond notes that during the good years, much of the island became increasingly deforested as the islanders consumed palms and hardwoods for various uses, including the manufacture of charcoal for heating and cooking.[25] By the 1400s almost all trees had disappeared.[26] Once the trees disappeared, the islanders were no longer able to construct boats for trade.[27] Wild sources of food were lost because there were no forests to sustain wildlife, and the population exploited fish stocks to extinction.[28] Agriculture also collapsed: the loss of forests led to top soil erosion and nutrient loss as crops were defenseless against wind and rain.[29] Starvation became the order of the day, leading to civil war, population crash, and cannibalism.[30] Captain Cook visited the island in 1774 and observed that the islanders were “small, lean, timid, and miserable.”[31] The number of home sites in the coastal region “declined by 70% from peak values around 1400â€“1600 to the 1700s. . . .”[32] By 1872, only 111 islanders were left on Easter, compared with a minimum population of 6000 to 8000 before the crash began.[33]

#### Scenario 2 is Caribbean Adaptation

#### Some warming is inevitable, but shifts in consumption can still mitigate its risks

Pollard, quoting analysis from a Prof. of Atmospheric & Oceanic Studies @ UCLA, 2012

[8/19/12, Logan Nakayanzi, reporter for The Huffington Post, citing analysis from Dr. Alex Hall, Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, UCLA, PhD in Atmospheric and Ocean Sciences from Princeton, “Is Global Warming Inevitable? A Case Study,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/logan-nakyanzi-pollard/global-warming-inevitable_b_1793487.html>] Idriss

So, is warming inevitable? Yes and no, says lead UCLA investigator Professor Alex Hall. "In the study, we examined two emissions scenarios, a 'business-as-usual' scenario where greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase at the same rate as they have in the recent past, and a 'mitigation' scenario, where emissions begin to decrease over the next decade or two." "In the mitigation scenario, we see about 70 percent of the warming that we see in the business-as-usual by mid-century. This indicates that some warming is probably inevitable in the region, no matter what decisions are made in the coming decades regarding greenhouse gas emissions," says Hall. "However, beyond mid-century, the choices we make in the coming years make a much larger difference in how much climate change materializes." That's science talk for 'now would be a good time to make some adjustments,' something Pasadena seems to have picked up on again, this time with its bag initiative. Hall was reluctant to give recommendations on how individual efforts can help steer us off this course, but Bill Patzert is more forthcoming: "There's no going back, it's irreversible," says the veteran climatologist. "The length and duration of heat waves have dramatically increased. A two- to three-day heat wave will be the two-week heat wave in the 21st century."

#### Specifically, it’s too late to stop climate change in the Caribbean – we can only work to mitigate its impacts

Dubrie, et. Al, United Nations Environment Programme Team, 2008

[Artie, Ozone Action Programme at the UN Environment Programme Team, Chris Corbin, Caribbean Environmental Programme, Kakuko Nagatani, Graciela Metternicht, and Silvia Giada of the Division of Early Warning and Assessment, Mark Griffith of Small Islands Development States, ROLAC, Ricardo Sanchez Sosa, Regional Director, ROLAC, <http://www.pnuma.org/deat1/pdf/Climate_Change_in_the_Caribbean_Final_LOW20oct.pdf>] Idriss

Caribbean SIDS now experiences the impacts of human-induced climate change. Time is running out and there is an urgent need to translate ideas into concrete action. In Bali, December 2007, AOSIS remarked that climate change is the critical issue that confronts each and every one of the 44 members estates as SIDS endeavour to advance on a sustainable basis while preserving the core cultural values and unique island identity. For SIDS, the goal of stabilizing temperatures at 2 degrees above pre industrial levels, fails to consider the survival of island states, and means the loss of many critical ecosystem, including coral reef and fisheries, the flood of coastal communities, stronger storms, reduced water supply, increased droughts and desertification and threaten to food security. Consequently AOSIS claimed that the avoidance of adverse impacts on SIDS should be the fundamental benchmark against which all the negotiation of the Bali Roadmap be conducted.

#### Effective regional cooperation is key to resource and disease management, and environmental efforts – builds consensus that overwhelms political opposition

GFDRR, Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2012

[“Regional cooperation in Disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation: Progress and future plans,” http://gfdrr.org/docs/8thCG\_Annex\_B.pdf] Idriss

The development potential of regional cooperation

1. Many of today’s development issues call for neighboring countries to work together—for example, to manage water and other natural resources, facilitate trade and transport, provide for reliable sources of energy, and protect against the spread of disease and environmental degradation. At the same time, regional cooperation programs provide countries with opportunities to (i) increase efficiency and economic integration (e.g. through trade facilitation programs, coordination of large scale investments, harmonization of policies, integration of services, etc.); (ii) lower investment costs (tapping economies of scale); (iii) share and promote good development practices (e.g. policies, knowledge, etc.). 2. Regional cooperation can provide solutions to complex issues in countries threatened by difficult socio-economic and political situations. A regional perspective on national issues is also critical in that it brings in an ‘external’ viewpoint, helping to build consensus around complex issues. In certain cases, regional cooperation can be an instrument to ensure objectivity in national government’s decision-making and resource allocation, thus promoting good governance and stability. 3. The 2007 World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) report “The development potential of Regional Programs”, the first thorough review of Bank’s regional programs, recommended that stronger results could be achieved if regional programs were linked to and complement national country assistance strategies. In all of the reviewed programs, what has generally worked best is reliance on regional and sub-regional institutions for services which cannot be performed efficiently by national agencies (e.g. coordination, data gathering, technical assistance, dispute resolution, monitoring and evaluation). 4. Disasters are by their very nature cross-border phenomena and often their consequences affect multiple countries (e.g. river basins, coastal areas, etc.). In this context, Disaster Risk Reduction appears to be one of the areas where the comparative advantage of cooperating at regional level is the highest. 5. Undertaking disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures at regional level, in partnership with regional inter-governmental bodies and organizations, offers several advantages, such as: - Benefitting from economies of scale when developing Early Warning Systems; - Joining forces when conducting risk assessment related to hydro-geological, meteorological, and climatological hazards threatening the same area (e.g. a river basin); - Lowering entrance barriers to risk insurance markets for developing countries’ government and offering new business opportunities to private insurers willing to invest in small states (e.g. island states); - Promoting standards such as building codes and influencing DRR-related policies and regulations; - Sharing data and tools(e.g. risk models), best practices, and promoting exchange of expertise among neighboring countries; - Avoiding unintended negative externalities of DRR investments in one country on disaster vulnerability in another; 6. The regional approach in DRR has proved to be a successful model to advance the disaster risk reduction agenda. GFDRR cooperation with regional organization on disaster risk reduction is already yielding concrete results at national level in many disaster prone areas of the world. ASEAN, Arab Academy, CDEMA, SOPAC, CEPREDENAC, SAARC, ECOWAS, SADC and other regional organizations have been instrumental to promote regional disaster risk assessment, risk financing and insurance facilities in different sub-regions. 7. The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, a regional initiative of the Governments in the region with support from development partners, allows countries in the Caribbean regions to pool the risk of hazards and jointly address the need for immediate liquidity following a disaster by transferring risk to the insurance and reinsurance markets. In Africa, cooperation with the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Center (ICPAC) is improving the ability to use regional modeling techniques to assist in the development of adaptation and climate risk management. . 8. The regional dimension is equally important in post-disaster situations. In this context, the leadership of a regional/sub-regional organization and the negotiation carried out by ‘peer’ member states can help overcome gaps and barriers thus accelerating the recovery process. A good example of that is the role played by ASEAN in liaising with Myanmar’s Junta and leading international recovery efforts in the country, following the devastation of cyclone Nargis. 9. Regional organizations play an important role in strengthening institutional capacity for addressing the human resource need of disaster risk reduction. GFDRR is partnering with regional organizations to provide training and learning opportunities on a regional scale. Adjusted to the specific needs of the regions the capacity building contributes to both improved awareness and to advanced analytical skills and professional knowledge in DRR. GFDRR has for example placed DRR Advisors at ECOWAS and SADC to strengthen their capacity in DRR related matters.

#### Global climate change poses immediate risks in the Caribbean – laundry list of impacts

BioD (ecosystems, reefs), Caribbean/Cuban Ag, another i/l to water wars, disease, econ (infrastructure damage), soil erosion

AOSIS and UNF, Alliance of Small Island States and The United Nations Foundation, 2008

[2/5/08, “GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES: FINANCING ADAPTATION,” <http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/suriname/shared/documents/papers/CLIMATECHANGEAOSIS_GreenPaper_Feb52008_.pdf>] Idriss

Global climate change poses a grave, imminent danger to all aspects of development (socio-economic and environmental) in SIDS. What is especially troubling is that small island developing states contribute the least to the problem of global climate change (both in terms of per capita and aggregate greenhouse gas emissions), but are among the most vulnerable to its adverse effects. All SIDS confront development and human life threats that could result in widescale habitat and eco-system destruction. Anthropogenic climate change is expected to6: • Negatively impact on agricultural productivity throughout the tropics and sub-tropics. • Seriously compromise fresh water quantity and quality, especially in Pacific and Caribbean SIDS. • Increase the incidence of malaria, dengue, and other vector-borne diseases in the tropics and sub-tropics. • Harm ecological systems and their biodiversity. • Raise sea levels due to increases in temperature, displacing tens of millions of people living in low-lying coastal zones, and rendering uninhabitable those SIDS that are at or below sea-level. • Shift tourism patterns, a major industry for many SIDS, towards higher altitudes and latitudes. This is projected to result in a potential drop of 20-50% in the tourism sector.7 For example, it is already clear that such SIDS as the Maldives in the Indian Ocean — an increasingly popular tourist destination — are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise.8 • Yield significant coastal damage, including beach erosion, destruction of valuable coral reefs, loss of coastal areas, and damage to infrastructure (such as roads, bridges, utility lines, bridges). • Make inland areas susceptible to property and infrastructure damage from flooding and soil erosion in areas where upland watersheds are in poor condition, particularly on larger islands.

#### The Caribbean is a unique biodiversity hotspot

CEPF ‘10

(quoting Mittermeier -- the same author that establishes the “hotspot” thesis and writes our impact ev. , Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in Biological Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. CEPF is the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund – “Ecosystem Profile: THE CARIBBEAN ISLANDS BIODIVERSITY HOTSPOT” – Prepared by: BirdLife International¶ in collaboration with:¶ Durrell Wildlife Conservation¶ Trust / Bath University¶ The New York Botanical Garden¶ and with the technical support of:¶ Conservation International-Center¶ for Applied Biodiversity Science; assistance for this report was offered by 100 international and non-profit organizations. Jan 15th – http://www.cepf.net/Documents/Final\_Caribbean\_EP.pdf)

The Caribbean Islands Hotspot is one of the world’s greatest centers of biodiversity and¶ endemism, yet its biodiversity and the natural¶ services it provides are highly threatened. Although¶ the islands have protected areas systems, most ar¶ e inadequately managed and important areas lack¶ protection. This strategy will ensure that CEPF¶ funds are employed in the most effective manner¶ and generate significant conservation results that¶ not only complement the actions of other¶ stakeholders but also enable significant expansion¶ of strategic conservation for the benefit of all.¶ Everyone depends on Earth’s ecosystems and their life-sustaining benefits, such as clean air,¶ fresh water and healthy soils. Founded in 2000,¶ the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF)¶ has become a global leader in en¶ abling civil society to participate in and benefit from conserving¶ some of the world’s most critical ecosystems. C¶ EPF is a joint initiative of l'Agence Française de¶ Développement, Conservation International, the Gl¶ obal Environment Facility, the Government of¶ Japan, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the World Bank. As one of the¶ founding partners, Conservation International ad¶ ministers the global program through a CEPF¶ Secretariat.¶ CEPF provides grants for nongovern¶ mental and other private organizations to help protect¶ biodiversity hotspots, Earth’s most biologically¶ rich and threatened areas. The convergence of¶ critical areas for conservation with millions¶ of people who are impoverished and highly¶ dependent on healthy ecosystems is more ev¶ ident in the hotspots than anywhere else.¶ CEPF is unique among funding mechanisms in th¶ at it focuses on biological areas rather than¶ political boundaries and examines conservation th¶ reats on a landscape-scale basis. A fundamental¶ purpose of CEPF is to ensure that civil society is¶ engaged in efforts to conserve biodiversity in¶ the hotspots, and to this end, CEPF provides ci¶ vil society with an agile and flexible funding¶ mechanism complementing funding currently¶ available to government agencies.¶ CEPF promotes working alliances among commun¶ ity groups, nongovernmental organizations¶ (NGOs), government, academic institutions and¶ the private sector, combining unique capacities¶ and eliminating duplication of efforts for a¶ comprehensive approach to conservation. CEPF¶ targets trans-boundary cooperation for areas rich of¶ biological value that straddle national borders¶ or in areas where a regional approach may be more effective than a national approach.¶ A recent, updated analysis reveals the existence of¶ 34 biodiversity hotspots, each holding at least¶ 1,500 endemic plant species, and having lost at¶ least 70 percent of its original habitat extent¶ (Mittermeier¶ et al¶ . 2005). The Caribbean islands qualify as one of these global biodiversity¶ hotspots by virtue of their high endemicity and high degree of threat.¶ The Caribbean Islands Hotspot is exceptionally important for global biodiversity conservation.¶ The hotspot includes important ecosystems, fro¶ m montane cloud forests to coral reefs, and¶ supports populations of unique species amounting to at least 2 percent of the world’s total¶ species.

#### Ecosystem destruction risks human survival

Coyne and Hoekstra 7 – \*professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago, \*\*Associate Professor in the Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University (Jerry and Hopi, The New Republic, “The Greatest Dying,” 9/24, http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatest-dying)

But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive – which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster.

In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs – a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion.

In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems – those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace – has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber. Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace.

Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who really cares if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those who suffer from cardiovascular disease. The recent discovery of a rare South American leech has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots. And it's not just this one species of worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin (a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin (another anticoagulant).

Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin. More than a quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that saved the life of one of our friends.

Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been screened for pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what life-saving drugs remain to be discovered? Given current extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years.

Our arguments so far have tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans. That is why conservationists always base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures? And what could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins, and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship and common origin of all species is a spiritual experience – not necessarily religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul.

But, whether or not one is moved by such concerns, it is certain that our future is bleak if we do nothing to stem this sixth extinction. We are creating a world in which exotic diseases flourish but natural medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste accumulates while food sources dwindle; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and impure water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not immune to extinction. Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching out a grubby existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when humanity finally faces the consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them all.

#### Infectious diseases cause extinction – threat higher than ever

**Platt, 10** – Science journalist, Scientific American (John R., “Humans are more at risk from diseases as biodiversity disappears,” Scientific American, 12/7, http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/extinction-countdown/2010/12/07/humans-are-more-at-risk-from-diseases-as-biodiversity-disappears/)

Well, according to new research published December 2 in Nature, the answer is yes—healthy biodiversity is essential to human health. As species disappear, infectious diseases rise in humans and throughout the animal kingdom, so extinctions directly affect our health and chances for survival as a species. (Scientific American is part of Nature Publishing Group.) "Biodiversity loss tends to increase pathogen transmission across a wide range of infectious disease systems," the study’s first author, Bard College ecologist Felicia Keesing, said in a prepared statement. These pathogens can include viruses, bacteria and fungi. And humans are not the only ones at risk: all manner of other animal and plant species could be affected. The rise in diseases and other pathogens seems to occur when so-called "buffer" species disappear. Co-author Richard Ostfeld of the Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies points to the growing number of cases of Lyme disease in humans as an example of how this happens. Opossum populations in the U.S. are down due to the fragmentation of their forest habitats. The marsupials make poor hosts for the pathogen that causes Lyme disease; they can also better defend themselves from the black-legged ticks that carry the affliction to humans than can white-footed mice, which, on the other hand, are thriving in the altered habitat—and along with them disease-carrying ticks. "The mice increase numbers of both the black-legged tick vector and the pathogen that causes Lyme disease," Ostfeld said.

#### Soil erosion causes extinction

Asabe 2 (American Society of Agricultural Engineers, “In Defense of Soil and Water Resources in the United States: Soil Erosion Research Priorities”, December, http://www.asabe.org/pr/soilerosion.html)

Our soil resource is vital to the survival of the human race. Not only does it provide the literal foundation of our existence, it is the source of most of the agricultural products that sustain us and our way of life—food, fiber, timber, and energy. Because damages to soil quality are nearly always permanent, preservation of this resource is critically important to maintaining agricultural productivity and environmental quality. One of the most widespread threats to soil quality is wind and water erosion, an ever-occurring process that impacts our lives in numerous ways, the direst of which is lost food production. It is estimated that soil erosion is damaging the productivity of 29% (112 million acres) of U.S. cropland and is adversely affecting the ecological health of 39% (145 million acres) of rangeland. In addition to on-site soil loss, erosion results in off-site sediment movement that can cause problems downstream. Sediment can deposit and clog drainage ways, increase potential for flooding, decrease reservoir capacity, and carry nutrients and pesticides that degrade water quality. Current assessments by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency of impaired water bodies indicate that 40% of the stream miles and 45% of the lake and reservoir areas are impaired because of sediment. Therefore, minimizing erosion is not only important for saving the soil, it is essential for preserving potable water resources and improving water and air quality.

#### Coral reefs prevent extinction

Philippine Daily Inquirer in ‘2

(“REEFS UNDER STRESS”, 12-10, L/N)

Another possibility is that global environmental damage might increase the gap between rich and poor soci¬eties, with the poor then violently confronting the rich for a fairer share of the world’s wealth. Severe conflict may also arise from frustration with countries that do not go along with agreements to protect the global envi¬ronment, or that “free-ride” by letting other countries absorb the costs of environmental protection. Warmer temperatures could lead to contention over more easily harvested resources in the Antarctic. Bulging populations and land stress may produce waves of environmental refugees, spilling across borders and disrupting relations among ethnic groups. Countries might fight among themselves because of dwindling supplies of water and the effects of upstream pollution.6 A sharp decline in food crop production and grazing land could lead to conflict between nomadic tribes and seden¬tary farmers. Environmental change could in time cause a slow deepening of poverty in poor countries, which might open bitter divisions between classes and ethnic groups, corrode democratic institutions, and spawn revolutions and insurgencies. In general, many experts have the sense that environmental problems will “ratchet up” the level of stress within states and the inter¬national community, increasing the likelihood of many different kinds of conflict—from war and rebellion to trade disputes—and undermining possibilities for cooperation.

#### Independently, environmental destruction leads to global wars

Homer-Dixon 98 (Thomas, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Programme – University of Toronto, World Security Challenges for a New Century, p. 342-343)

Another possibility is that global environmental damage might increase the gap between rich and poor soci¬eties, with the poor then violently confronting the rich for a fairer share of the world’s wealth. Severe conflict may also arise from frustration with countries that do not go along with agreements to protect the global envi¬ronment, or that “free-ride” by letting other countries absorb the costs of environmental protection. Warmer temperatures could lead to contention over more easily harvested resources in the Antarctic. Bulging populations and land stress may produce waves of environmental refugees, spilling across borders and disrupting relations among ethnic groups. Countries might fight among themselves because of dwindling supplies of water and the effects of upstream pollution.6 A sharp decline in food crop production and grazing land could lead to conflict between nomadic tribes and seden¬tary farmers. Environmental change could in time cause a slow deepening of poverty in poor countries, which might open bitter divisions between classes and ethnic groups, corrode democratic institutions, and spawn revolutions and insurgencies. In general, many experts have the sense that environmental problems will “ratchet up” the level of stress within states and the inter¬national community, increasing the likelihood of many different kinds of conflict—from war and rebellion to trade disputes—and undermining possibilities for cooperation.

#### Effective multilateral cooperation is key to climate adaptation – tech sharing and energy access

AOSIS and UNF, Alliance of Small Island States and The United Nations Foundation, 2008

[2/5/08, “GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES: FINANCING ADAPTATION,” <http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/suriname/shared/documents/papers/CLIMATECHANGEAOSIS_GreenPaper_Feb52008_.pdf>] Idriss

Although the biggest impact on adaptation will result from the actions taken by national governments, there are substantial benefits to be gained from international collaboration in this area. International collaboration refers to activities undertaken jointly by a variety of actors—including governments, international organizations, multilateral financial institutions, the private sector, NGOs, research institutions, and civil society—in pursuit of shared objectives that form part of an agreed agenda. International collaboration should enhance, not displace, independent national initiatives.24 It could support national governments and industries to build market frameworks, strengthen local capacity, and enhance technical know-how through information exchange, networking and facilitation of relationships, and linking local players to international expertise. International collaboration is useful to exchange experiences, learn from each other, and discuss best practices in order to avoid time-consuming and costly mistakes and adopt “short-cuts” to success. By tying national efforts to the broader international community, a country can reap the benefits of adaptation practices, technology improvements, and cost reductions at home, while contributing to the collective scale-up of adaptation practices worldwide. Possible benefits of international collaboration on adaptation could include: • Enhanced knowledge of effective market strategies and mechanisms. • Reduced trade and investment barriers. • Increased South-South and North-South trade opportunities. • Improved employment and income opportunities. • Increased energy access to those in need.

#### The OAS is critical to regional adaptation efforts – facilitates public-private partnerships and implementation

O’Keefe, Prof of IR @ Stanford, 2012

[Thomas Andrew, President of Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd., Professor of International Relations and Earth Systems at Stanford, M. Phil in Latin American Studies of History and Economics from Oxford, “PROMOTING ENERGY SECURITY AND TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AT THE CARTAGENA SUMMIT,” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/7/07%20summit%20of%20the%20americas/07%20energy%20security%20okeefe.pdf>] Idriss

For its part, the Organization of American States (OAS) oversees implementation of the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Program (CSEP) funded primarily by the European Union, with some contributions from the U.S. Department of Energy, to enable the tiny island nations of the Eastern Caribbean and the Bahamas to increase the sustainability of their energy supplies while reducing carbon emissions through the development and use of renewable energy and energy efficiency systems. The OAS also oversees implementation of a Caribbean-wide program funded by the Energy Department to facilitate regional dialogue on long-term sustainable energy solutions, and to help national governments promote and implement sustainable energy policies and programs through short-term legal counseling and technical assistance. Overall, the OAS has emerged as a central clearinghouse for disseminating information on ECPA initiatives and bringing together potential public and private sector partners.

#### Adapting to impending climate changes is vital to survival

AOSIS and UNF, Alliance of Small Island States and The United Nations Foundation, 2008

[2/5/08, “GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES: FINANCING ADAPTATION,” <http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/suriname/shared/documents/papers/CLIMATECHANGEAOSIS_GreenPaper_Feb52008_.pdf>] Idriss

• Though mitigation is important, there have been extensive resources, projects, and programs dedicated to this area over the last two decades. Thus, the paper focuses primarily on adaptation practices to address climate change in SIDS. • Financing of adaptation in SIDS is a priority, though the paper will need to identify and suggest recommendations for addressing a range of other barriers such as capacity building, policy support, education and outreach, monitoring and evaluation, etc. • Sustainable development and climate change should be jointly addressed and not viewed in isolation of each other. Sustainable development for SIDS is only possible if climate change adaptation is effectively integrated into broader national sustainable development plans, policies, projects, and programs. In particular, urgent and timely attention should be given to linkages with the MDGs, which are central to reducing poverty and enhancing economic and social development by 2015. • Climate risk-management is a crucial element of climate change adaptation and should be addressed in a broad framework that allows for national, regional, and global synergies. Areas to consider include climate change, disaster reduction, and desertification. • Immediate action to mitigate and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change makes sound fiscal and economic sense. The costs of inaction far outweigh the costs of early action.

#### Scenario 3 is Conflict Management

#### Multilateral institutions like the Organization of American States are critical to deescalating riparian disputes and conflict management – contains and outweighs all scenarios

Hensel, et. Al, Profs. of Poli Sci @ UNT, MSU, & Lamar U, 2006

[Paul R. Hensel, Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, PhD in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, PhD in Political Science from Michigan State University, Thomas E. Sowers II, PhD in Political Science from Florida State University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lamar University, “Conflict management of riparian disputes,” Political Geography 25 (2006) pg. 383-411] Idriss

One of the key problems limiting cooperation between states in the international system is the lack of an overarching authority to enforce agreements. In the domestic sphere, the government can intervene to enforce contracts. Because of the lack of a central authority internationally, states are forced to find other mechanisms to enforce their agreements. One of the options available is for states to create institutions. Although these institutions do not enjoy the same amount of power as a government, they provide a structure for the enforcement of an agreement that should mitigate the need for militarized disputes to resolve conflict. Institutions offer a potential solution to the problem of managing common water resources. Institutions can serve to provide assurances that treaties will be followed by riparians (Sowers, 2002). A treaty without effective enforcement mechanisms is not likely to offset future conflict. 11 Institutions can serve as an outlet for conflict management by providing an arena for riparians to resolve their differences, by providing neutral information, reducing uncertainty, and minimizing transaction costs (Keohane, 1984). Some institutions explicitly manage water- related conflicts, such as regional trade agreements in Africa (Powers, 2004a, 2004b). When an effective institution is present, a riparian dispute can be referred to the institution for resolution, which diminishes the possibility that the disputing parties will resort to the threat or use of force. Institutions may also have a more passive effect on conflict management (Mitchell & Hensel, 2005), by creating regular forums that facilitate bilateral negotiations between members and encouraging norms of peaceful conflict resolution (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Institutions created by the United States and Canada to resolve their river conflicts provide great examples of the benefits of river-specific institutions for conflict management. The International Joint Commission (IJC) has existed since 1909 and regulates all shared water between the United States and Canada. Disputes between the riparians are referred to this international commission, which works to resolve contentious issues. The IJC has been effective in regulating the Great Lakes and overseeing numerous hydroelectric projects that involve both states. The United States and Canada also belong to a number of regional and global organizations that call for peaceful dispute settlement, such as the Organization of American States, the Rio Pact, and the United Nations. These shared institutional memberships create more general forums for peaceful negotiations over river issues. Thus we expect that institutions (river-specific or general) designed to manage riparian conflict will decrease the likelihood of militarized conflict, and increase the frequency and effectiveness of peaceful conflict management.

#### Riparian disputes magnify conflict – their defense doesn’t assume future scarcity levels, only we solve

Hensel, et. Al, Profs. of Poli Sci @ UNT, MSU, & Lamar U, 2006

[Paul R. Hensel, Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, PhD in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, PhD in Political Science from Michigan State University, Thomas E. Sowers II, PhD in Political Science from Florida State University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lamar University, “Conflict management of riparian disputes,” Political Geography 25 (2006) pg. 383-411] Idriss

These results, particularly those for river-specific institutions, suggest that international institutions can help to overcome obstacles to cooperation in an anarchic international system. Even when the issue at stake is as important as water, a vital resource for human existence, we find that river institutions have been quite effective at reducing militarized conflict over the rivers in question and at promoting the success of negotiations over river-related issues. This is particularly consistent with the work of Mitchell and Hensel (2005), who suggest that institutions can have a ‘‘passive’’ effect of promoting conflict resolution among their members, even if they are not having an ‘‘active’’ effect by settling the conflict through direct involvement.34 Several caveats to our analyses are in order, though. First, with respect to the militarization of river claims, it is clear that fewer river claims lead to militarized activity than is popularly believed. For all the academic and policy-oriented discussions of ‘‘water wars’’ dominating future conflict, we have identified only 17 militarized interstate disputes between 1900 and 2001 that explicitly involved attempts to alter the river-related status quo. One partial explanation for this lack of ‘‘water wars’’ e even in the Middle East, the region where most expect the worst conflict to occur e is that river-specific institutions have made a positive contribution to avoid armed conflict over rivers. Such institutions did significantly reduce militarized conflict in our analyses where they were present, although conflict was still rare even where no institutions existed at the time of the claim. Another partial explanation for the relative rarity of armed conflict over rivers may be that these river claims have not taken place in areas with the most extreme water shortages, and that future conflict might be more likely as water demands rise and water supplies decrease in both quality and quantity. Our analyses revealed that greater levels of challenger water scarcity increase the likelihood of armed conflict, so as scarcity levels are expected to rise in coming decades, we might reasonably expect militarized conflict to rise as well e although there is still room for hope if effective river institutions can be put into place to try to manage rivers peacefully.

#### Independently, border disputes coming now despite current effort

Oppenheimer 9/25/13- a Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald (Andres, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25 2013, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/)//CW

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region.¶ U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste.¶ Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation.”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”